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Summary 
The functioning of democratic institutions has the potential to bring about substantial policy change in 
favour of poor and marginalised people. However, there is a limited understanding of how to strengthen 
the political representation of poor people within democratic structures. This paper looks at one example 
of how the political representation of a historically marginalised and excluded group – pastoralists in 
Ethiopia – is shifting and changing. Based on research at federal, regional and sub-regional levels in 
Ethiopia, it discusses the establishment of a body within parliament committed to representing this group. 
It identifies the critical factors which led to its formation as changes in the broader political environment 
as well as a specific moment of change, the role of key actors both internally and externally, and the 
cumulative effect of the mobilisation of a substantial group of MPs. The paper also discusses the 
limitations of both this body and other structures of political representation in the political context of 
Ethiopia. The key constraint to effective political representation is identified as the broader political 
environment, including a lack of political competition and an absence of institutionalised democratic 
processes.  
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1  Introduction 
Recent shifts in development thinking emphasise the importance of increasing the influence of poor and 
marginalised people in the decision-making processes that affect their lives. In the context of widespread 
disillusionment with formal political systems, researchers, policy-makers and activists have extolled the 
virtues of forms of direct participation. These are seen to provide opportunities for citizens to play a more 
active role in policy processes and to increase state responsiveness (Cornwall and Gaventa 2000; Gaventa 
and Valderrama 1999). There have undoubtedly been benefits from such “direct democracy” initiatives in 
many places. Nonetheless, there is a danger that the current popularity of such approaches has led to a 
neglect of the importance of the effective representation of poor and marginalised people through formal 
democratic structures. Such representation has the potential to transform public policy in favour of the 
disadvantaged on a scale which few “civil society” mobilisations could achieve. Yet, in practice, poor 
people and marginalised groups are usually ill-served by those who claim to “represent” them, and do not 
enjoy an influence commensurate with their numbers (Moore and Putzel 1999).  
Despite the potential for significant change through the functioning of democratic structures, we 
have a limited understanding of how “representatives” of poor people can be encouraged to work more 
actively on behalf of poor people within such structures. We also have little knowledge of the conditions 
when their mobilisation becomes effective and creates policy change. This paper looks at one example of 
how the political representation of a historically marginalised and excluded group – pastoralists in 
Ethiopia – is shifting and changing. It considers how opportunities for collective action within formal 
political structures were created by changes in the broader political environment and seized on by key 
actors. It discusses the establishment of a body within Parliament committed to representing this group in 
society, and the limitations of both this body and other formal structures of political representation in the 
broader political context of Ethiopia.  
Pastoralists, and the cultural and economic parameters of their existence have historically been 
misrepresented, misunderstood and marginalised by nation-states (Spencer 1998). Academic literature, 
primarily by anthropologists, has described the tensions in a number of countries between the ‘centrifugal 
ideology of nomads’ seeking autonomy and mobility, and the ‘centripetal ideology of the sedentary state 
that strives for dominance and encapsulation’ (Fratkin 1997: 239, drawing on Meir 1988). As states have 
attempted to impose institutions developed for a sedentary population, pastoral institutions have come 
under strain (Salih 2001), and pastoralist /state relations have often been conflictual.  
Ethiopia has not been exempt from this conflict. From the colonial powers, to Emperor Haile 
Selassie to the Marxist Derg to the current government, successive regimes have swung between 
neglecting the country’s pastoralists, and trying to exploit them and the lands they inhabit wherever 
possible. Historically, the exclusion of pastoralists from Ethiopian life has been economic, political and 
social, and their interests have been ignored. However, many pastoralists and non-pastoralists suggest that 
there have recently been significant changes in the attitude of both the government and broader society 
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towards pastoralism, an acknowledgement of their needs, and the beginning of a recognition of 
pastoralism as a valid livelihood strategy. 
This shift and the optimism it has created amongst various actors provides the background to this 
paper, which presents the findings of a study commissioned by the Pastoralist Communication Initiative 
(PCI), a DFID-funded project operating in Ethiopia, in collaboration with the Institute of Development 
Studies, Sussex. The PCI aims to promote communication between all the actors engaged in the process 
of making and implementing policy that affects pastoralists. It operates on the assumption that improved 
articulation of citizen voices and generation of effective institutional responsiveness can lead to beneficial 
impacts for citizens. It recognises that between the citizen and the institutional response lies a complex 
terrain of politics, power, leadership, culture and representation.  
This study aimed to support learning among members of the Ethiopian parliament, pastoralist 
leaders and interlocutors in pastoralist policy in Ethiopia. In particular it sought to: 
 
• document the process which has led to the current state of pastoralist parliamentary representation. 
• consider how pastoralist peoples are represented by their federal representatives.  
• attempt to assess the impact of this representation on policy processes. 
• consider the interaction and relationship between federal/regional structures of political 
representation and traditional structures of representation. 
• explore further how pastoralist peoples understand the concept of “political representation”. 
 
Its focus was on the functioning of pastoralist representation within the broader political context in 
Ethiopia, and particularly on the role of pastoralist federal MPs. It did not, however, attempt to assess in 
depth the range of constraints to the functioning of democratic structures of government in specific 
pastoralist areas.  
After a brief summary of the research method, the paper explores the concept of “representation”, 
defining how it will be used within this paper and setting out a framework for the analysis. The bulk of the 
paper analyses “representation” through three mediating processes identified in that framework. Section 
three provides the context within which those processes operate, looking at the dynamics of policy-
making in Ethiopia, including the current political context, the shifts that are occurring and the ways in 
which both “representation” and “pastoralist” policy are understood. Section four analyses the 
functioning of the federal parliament, particularly the relationships of federal MPs with their constituents, 
and the activity of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Pastoralist Affairs (PSC). Section five 
examines the functioning of regional and sub-regional structures. After a brief discussion of the historical, 
political and cultural contexts to the fieldwork sites, this section analyses regional government and the 
woreda/kebele1 structures. Section six considers the interaction between state and traditional structures of 
                                                 
1  For a discussion of the levels of local government in Ethiopia see p23.  
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representation, before the final section provides concluding analysis of the processes and dynamics of 
pastoralist representation in Ethiopia.  
 
1.1 Research method 
The research was carried out in three phases, with review of the method and the research questions 
between each phase. Relevant documentation was also reviewed.  
Feedback sessions were held at each stage both with PCI staff members and also with members of 
the PSC. 
The first phase, which took place in January 2003, was conducted in Addis Ababa and was focused 
on the federal context. MPs, Ministers, donors, civil society leaders, Ethiopian experts and opposition 
politicians were questioned in semi-structured interviews about the role of pastoralist parliamentarians 
broader concepts of representation, and changes in the political context in Ethiopia.  
The second phase of the research was carried out in March and April 2003 and involved fieldwork in 
Borana region, Oromia State. The author, and a PCI facilitator and translator accompanied three federal 
MPs to their constituencies and observed the work of these MPs. They also conducted interviews and 
group discussions with zonal, woreda and kebele officials, traditional elders and women. Meetings were 
also held with representatives of international NGOs, and the regional state government in Addis.  
The third phase of research took place in May 2003, when the researcher travelled to Somali region 
with a federal MP from the area, and a PCI facilitator and translator. Interviews were conducted with 
federal MPs, a Member of the House of Federation, Regional MPs, regional officials, traditional elders, 
woreda officials, leaders of women’s groups and other citizens.  
The Borana and Somali sites for fieldwork were chosen not only for logistical reasons, but also to 
present contrasting pictures of the mediating role of different institutions at the sub-federal level. Oromia 
is a big and very diverse state, with large areas that rely on peasant production. The fieldwork in Borana 
was carried out in primarily pastoral and agro-pastoral areas, far from the regional capital in Addis. The 
data from that fieldwork relates mostly to the role of sub-regional institutions. In contrast, the whole of 
Somali region relies on pastoralism or agro-pastoralism for its economy. Sub-regional institutions are 
barely functioning in most of Somali region, partly due to the difficulty of the terrain, and the emphasis in 
the fieldwork was on the role of regional government based in Jijiga, which was the primary site for the 
Somali fieldwork. 
The research suffered several constraints, most particularly: 
 
• the general political context in which several informants expressed unwillingness to speak openly to a 
researcher about sensitive political issues. It is likely that many informants felt this but did not 
express it.  
• the necessity of working through translators in some interviews.  
• heavy reliance on several key informants for interpretation of political issues. This was, however, 
mitigated to some extent by excellent recent analysis from other researchers. The work of Vaughan 
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and Tronvoll (2003), Aalen (2002) and Pausewang et al. (2002) have been cited heavily throughout 
this paper as their research is the most recent in-depth work on these issues. The findings of this 
study broadly concur with the conclusions of those authors. 
• the difficult and inaccessible terrain in which most pastoralists live. For that reason, the research 
tended to focus on urban centres, and inevitably reflects the views of those with most contact with 
those areas. 
 
Due to the relatively limited fieldwork involved in this study, the aim is to provide illustrative “snapshots” 
of how representation is shaped in the “mediating” processes identified in the framework. The paper 
makes no claim to be a comprehensive survey of representative structures and institutions in Ethiopia. 
 
2  Concepts of representation 
In Western political thought, the concept of representation is a difficult one and it is highly contested.2 
There is much debate but little agreement amongst political scientists and other theorists about what 
representation actually means (Manin et al. 1999). Ideas about representation are found in the theories of 
Burke, Bentham, Hobbes, John Stuart Mill, Toqueville, Schumpeter and Dahl (see Merrifield 1982, and 
Pitkin, 1967, for an analysis of key theorists). As Merrifield (1982) points out, the fact that there are such 
disputes about the concept of representation suggests that there is no one “correct” way to view it. 
An initial area of confusion arises from the different meanings that can be attributed to the words 
“represent”, “representation” and “representative” in English. The first distinction that should be made is 
between those who may be described as “representatives” (a noun) because of the positions they hold (for 
example, MPs and other elected officials), and those who are in some sense “representative” (an 
adjective). In this study “representative” is used primarily as an adjective, to avoid confusion and 
alternative words are found to describe positions held. However, this use as an adjective also has several 
meanings. It could be taken to refer either to those who are somehow typical of a broader population, or 
those who act on behalf of others. In this study, the definition of Hannah Pitkin (1967: 209) is used, who 
defines political representation as ‘acting in the interests of the represented’. Pitkin also points out that 
there is nothing that necessarily associates ideas around representation with democracy, since a monarch 
or ambassador can represent a nation. However, here “representative government” is understood as a 
system in which those who serve in government are placed in their positions on the basis of citizen 
selection. Representative government thus enables an indirect citizen presence in the legislative process 
(CPA 2001).  
There are, however a number of complexities around these definitions. The first relates to the idea of 
“interests”, and who decides what those interests are. In Western political thought the most common idea 
of representation focuses on the representative acting as the “agent” for the represented. Representatives 
                                                 
2  Conceptualisations of “representation” not based on Western liberal democratic theory which are present in 
Ethiopia are discussed in future sections where appropriate. 
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(such as MPs) can act as trustees who exercise their own judgement on behalf of those they represent, 
deciding what their interests are and acting accordingly. The role of the represented is restricted to 
determining whether to elect or re-elect their representative. An alternative view sees MPs as delegates, 
subordinating their own views to those of their constituents, who decide what their own interests are. MPs 
thus try to determine what their constituents want done and do it. Unlike trustees, delegates act according 
to the judgement of their constituents, not their own.  
A second issue related to the “interests” of the represented is how these interests are aggregated and, 
when there are differences in interests between citizens, whose interests come to dominate. How does one 
“representative” choose between the differing interests of many citizens? Do all citizens have equal 
opportunities to express their interests, and on what basis do some come to dominate? These questions 
are important, as those interests which are compromised or unrepresented in the process of aggregation 
do not get translated into policies.  
In democratic systems, political parties are one means through which interests are aggregated. Parties 
combine the articulated interests of interests and groups into an overall policy platform and seek election 
on that basis. However this adds a further complication to the issue of “representation”, as MPs are also 
representatives of parties. They follow the instruction of the party and its leadership and are thus limited in the 
extent to which they may take independent action either on the basis of their own opinions or the wishes 
of their constituents. This system of party representation is justified on the basis that elections are 
contested and organised around parties, and such an approach provides stability in Parliamentary systems.  
There are therefore three potentially contradictory understandings of how “political representatives” 
should act and the basis on which they make their decisions: as trustees, delegates, or representatives of 
parties. In practice, in most political contexts, elected representatives take decisions on their actions 
according to all three forms of representation, making trade-offs in different contexts. In the UK, for 
example, in the March 2003 parliamentary vote on war with Iraq, 140 Labour MPs rejected their party’s 
stance (party representation) and supported an anti-war motion, effectively voting against the government. 
It is not clear how many were primarily voting according to their own views of what was right (exercising 
trustee representation) or those of their constituents (exercising delegate representation), although 
certainly many MPs were subject to intensive lobbying by their constituents. 
A study of political representation in Ethiopia could address the extent to which elected 
representatives of government “act in the interests” of their constituents, and how they determine what 
those interests are. Indeed that is one element of this study. However, as the discussion above has 
suggested, there is no ‘right’ way to understand representation. It would be wrong to consider that there is 
an agreed standard or approach to representation by which it is possible to assess whether or not 
Ethiopian MPs and other representatives are “representative” or not. The concept is too contested, and 
there is no set of criteria against which individual performance can be measured.  
Furthermore, such an exclusive focus on the role of those holding representative positions is not 
necessarily particularly helpful for policy-makers and those who wish to understand the means by which 
the interests of marginalised people are either ignored or advanced in political processes. It is therefore 
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important to concentrate on the extent to which the outcomes of the “representation activity” are 
favourable to those whose interests the representative is responsible for advancing. It is necessary to 
consider the broader constraints to a favourable policy outcome, even when “representatives” themselves 
are actively advancing the interests of those they represent. Such a shift in focus is also reflected in some 
recent theoretical work on representation, which has moved away from a focus on “agency” in 
representation, towards a view of representation as a process, a relationship between the interests of 
citizens and the policy outcomes of government (Manin et al. 1999).   
A useful view is provided by Williams (1998: 23ff) who sees representation as a process, rather than 
the activities of individuals. Thus she writes of ‘representation as mediation’, in which the ‘different 
institutions and practices of any scheme of representation operate to shape and transform individual 
citizens’ political concerns and interests into governmental decisions and policies’. Such an approach 
focuses attention on the functioning of different institutions and practices which together mediate the 
relationships between citizen interests and policy outcomes. The activities of “representatives” are 
certainly one element of those institutions and practices. However, broader institutional factors and the 
functioning of political systems are also considered a critical part of the process of representation.  
Drawing on Williams’ work but expanding her ideas to take account of the Ethiopian context, this 
study examines three critical processes that mediate between citizen interests and policy outcomes, and 
hence shape the process of representation: 
 
• the functioning of the federal parliament 
• the functioning of regional and sub-regional systems of government 
• the interaction between formal and “traditional” or “customary” systems of government. 
 
There are, of course, other processes which mediate between citizen interests and policy outcomes, and 
other practices through which citizen interests might be fed into policy processes (for example, specific 
consultation processes around particular policies). However this study has limited itself to three of the 
most significant processes related to formal political structures. It also limits itself to a specific 
consideration of the relationship between pastoralist interests and the policy that affects them.  
The rest of this paper examines these three processes of representation that mediate between 
pastoralist interests and policy outcomes. However, these processes are embedded in and shaped by the 
broader political context and the dynamics of policy-making in Ethiopia. It is also affected by different 
perceptions of how “pastoralist policy” should be made. These are the subjects of the following section. 
 
3  The dynamics of policy-making in Ethiopia  
This section provides a brief introduction to politics and government in Ethiopia, including a discussion 
of recent reforms. It then explores both how the ruling party conceptualises “representation” and its role, 
and how “pastoralist policy” is conceived.  
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3.1 Political systems in Ethiopia 
The current regime in Ethiopia emerged following the overthrow in 1991 of the Derg, which had pursued 
a centralised Marxist-Leninist system of government since 1974, including a prolonged period of state 
terror. After a period of transitional rule, the ruling coalition, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) dominated by the TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Front) took power. This 
ruling coalition justifies its control of power by claiming to represent the interests of peasants, who 
provided its support-base during the conflict, and especially suppressed peasants from different ethnic 
groups. It claims that it liberated these groups from the economic exploitation and ethnic suppression 
suffered under previous regimes (Pausewang et al. 2002).  
A new constitution adopted in December 1994 created a federation of nine National Regional States 
(NRSs), delineated mostly according to the major language groups, with borders generally determined in a 
way designed to give particular ethnic groups control over areas they claimed as historic homelands 
(Joireman 1997). Regional states are divided into zones, woredas, kebeles and, in some cases, sub-kebeles, 
structures initially developed across Ethiopia under the Derg.  
The constitution provides for a democratic structure of governance, following a modern Western 
model of democracy, including a division of powers and the protection of human rights. The Constitution 
follows a parliamentary model and vests both legislative and oversight functions in a House of Peoples’ 
Representatives, elected by a “first-past-the-post” system. The House of Federation plays a constitutional 
role in safeguarding the interests of the nations and nationalities of Ethiopia, passing the legislation which 
defines the powers of government, as well as controlling important sources of revenue. Both the federal 
and regional governments have their own legislative, judicial and executive powers and the right to levy 
taxes and allocate budgets (Pausewang et al. 2002). 
Political parties exist, and elections do take place. There are three types of political parties in 
Ethiopia. The first are those parties belonging to the EPRDF. The dominant party is the TPLF, followed 
by the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM). The Oromo People’s Democratic 
Organisation (OPDO) and the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Front (SEPDF) for the Southern 
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS) are weaker members of the Front. The 
second type of party are EPRDF-affiliated parties which operate with somewhat looser ties in the more 
“peripheral” areas in Ethiopia: Afar, Somali, Harari, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Gambella. Thirdly, there 
are opposition parties. These are mostly very weak in organisational capacity, suffering from considerable 
resource constraints, and have shown little ability to coordinate amongst themselves to put pressure on 
the government. Many of them are also registered as regional parties and look to one ethnic group for 
their support, which further limits their ability to coordinate.  
Moreover, both opposition parties and candidates face considerable hurdles, including in some areas 
repression and intimidation. Elections at all levels have been affected by government interference and 
manipulation.  In the  federal elections  of 2000 there  were numerous  electoral irregularities.  Candidates 
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were also often imposed on constituencies by the EPRDF. In some areas there is doubt as to whether 
elections were held at all. Many have concluded that both these elections and the local elections of 2001 
were not “free and fair” (Pausewang et al. 2002).  
This failure in electoral practice has profound implications for a discussion of representation. In 
democratic theory, there are often seen to be two ways in which elections can induce representation in 
governments. Firstly, elections can provide a mandate, a means by which citizens signal to governments 
what they want them to do. Secondly, they are a mechanism of accountability, through which citizens can 
judge whether governments have carried out what they were elected to do (Przeworski et al. 1999). To 
date, most observers would agree that elections in Ethiopia have not served to provide either a mandate 
or a mechanism of accountability. This failure also affects the position and perceived legitimacy of 
individual “elected representatives”, as will be discussed further below. 
Thus, although the essentials for democratic development are in place in Ethiopia, there is a “two-
track structure” at all administrative levels. While there is a formal structure of democratic institutions, 
below the surface there is a party structure that keeps tight control at all levels and ensures that these 
democratic institutions cannot be used effectively to challenge its power. The political structure is built on 
a party with exclusive access to state resources, and material interests keep individuals loyal to that party or 
the broader coalition. As Markakis commented: 
 
Nearly all officials in the state administration from kebele to the federal government are EPRDF 
members, having joined the party before or soon after election to their post. Government business is 
discussed and decisions are made in party meetings that precede meetings of state bodies. In view of 
the party-state merger, it is understandable that Ethiopians have difficulty in distinguishing between 
them. 
(Markakis 2001, quoted in Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003: 35) 
 
Aside from the problems caused by the dual structure, there are groups which participate little in political 
life. Constitutionally, women have equality with men and are free to run for office at all levels. Certainly 
during the armed struggle the TPLF was enthusiastic about promoting the role of women. However, since 
1991, gender representation has not been a focus of attention and both government and opposition 
parties are dominated by men. There are few powerful women either within the Party leadership or within 
the Federal executive (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003). This pattern is repeated at regional and lower levels.  
The marginalised and stigmatised groups, often called “occupational castes”, found in every ethnic 
grouping are also traditionally excluded from the political arena. In Somali region, for example, these 
people are called Mijan, Yabir and Tumal. They are partly assimilated by the dominant group in the area 
where they live, but in the past held serf status. They could be purchased and sold, and had few political 
rights (Lewis 1955). Today, they still have limited land rights and enjoy limited social interaction with 
others. They are supposed to be represented by the dominant group in the area in which they live, but in 
practice continuing discrimination excludes them from local politics and the administrative system. 
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3.2 Reform and renewal? 
As argued above, beneath democratic institutions, the TPLF has established an administration and 
structure that perpetuates its rule. However, following splits in the TPLF in Spring 2001, the EPRDF 
announced a “renewal” process (tehadso), including reforms intended to separate powers between different 
branches of government (Pausewang et al. 2002). Four new “superministries” – the Ministries of Capacity 
Building, Infrastructure, Rural Development and Federal Affairs – have been established which remove a 
number of coordinating functions previously carried out by political advisers or by the Prime Minister’s 
Office.  
The establishment of these ministries could be understood as a move to institutionalise state 
structures and strengthen a civil service, removing a number of areas from personalised control. However, 
some note that a core of key ministries and agencies are still controlled by those loyal to the Prime 
Minister. It might thus be too early to comment on the actual impact of this reorganisation. Moreover, 
Vaughan and Tronvoll (2003) also raise the important point that the various measures proposed are in line 
with ‘a classic package of centralised bureaucratic reforms’. In a number of other African countries where 
these reforms have taken place, they have resulted in the retention of a clientelist system and the 
centralisation of power in an executive presidency which stands above factional politics and manipulates 
through control of financial and military resources (see Goetz and Lister 2001 for a discussion of this in 
the Ugandan context). Therefore although these changes might weaken the position of the ruling party in 
Ethiopia, they might not necessarily strengthen other representative institutions, and broaden political 
representation more widely. 
Along with a number of observers and analysts, interviewees in this study expressed a wide range of 
opinions on the reform process. Some fear that the commitment to opening up is rhetoric, with little of 
substance, certainly no tangible signs of a deepening democratisation. On the other hand, others speak of 
a slow opening up, of reformist elements within the party guiding changes, and the need to be optimistic 
about an “incremental” process of change and a situation which is “relatively better” than previously.  
 
3.3 The EPRDF and representation 
The ruling party’s conception of democracy has not historically been based on Western liberal ideals of 
individual participation, a diversity of views and plural representation. Instead it has been shaped both by 
Marxist-Leninist and Maoist ideologies and the EPRDF’s practical experience of mass political 
mobilisation during its struggle for power (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003). EPRDF conceptions of 
democracy are therefore based on “democratic centralism”,3 communal collective participation and 
representation based on consensus. Although the EPRDF changed its Marxist rhetoric in 1989/90 during 
the last phase of the struggle against the Derg regime, and opened up for multi-party democracy and 
                                                 
3  As Lenin described it, democratic centralism consists of ‘freedom of discussion and criticism, unity of action’. 
The democratic aspect of this methodology describes the freedom of members of the political party to discuss 
and debate matters of policy and direction; but once the decision by the party is made (by majority vote), all 
members are expected to follow that decision unquestioningly and dissent is ruled out. 
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market economy, ‘many Ethiopians from different walks of life still argue that the change was only in 
rhetoric and not in substance’ (Pausewang et al. 2002: 177). Whatever changes have taken place in recent 
years, there still remains a substantial legacy of Marxist thinking among powerful members of the EPRDF.  
This historical legacy has three significant and related implications for EPRDF views about 
pastoralist representation. Firstly, the EPRDF focus has generally been on the peasantry, which was 
historically regarded as a homogeneous mass with common needs, interests and political outlook. The 
need for a government to be responsive to the interests and needs of different groups has not traditionally 
been acknowledged.  
Secondly, this legacy affects how “the policy process” is understood. Agenda setting and policy 
formulation are seen to be the responsibility of the executive, and the dominant role of the ruling party in 
these activities is acknowledged. There is a view within government that policy should hammered out 
behind closed doors, with the input of experts, after which it is seen as the “absolute truth” and not 
subject to questioning. There is little perceived role for broader public participation in policy formulation. 
There are, however, signs that this view is changing slightly. For example, some consultation occurred 
around the PRSP, although it is not clear how this was actually used in the formulation of the PRSP 
(Longo 2002). 
There are two particular implications of this view of the policy process. Firstly, despite a stated 
commitment to decentralised government, the federal level is seen as responsible for policy formulation, 
with the role of the regions limited to implementation. Policy failure is frequently attributed to failure of 
implementation, which is the result of “technical” and “capacity” issues at regional level. The political 
nature of policy is thus often masked.4 The second implication of this view of policy is the limited role 
ascribed to parliament or other actors. While there is an understanding that parliament has a 
constitutionally assigned role in the legislative process, it is widely acknowledged that parliamentarians 
rarely influence the formulation of legislation or other policy statements.5  
Thirdly, the Marxist legacy has left what Vaughan and Tronvoll (2003: 10) describe as ‘an ideological 
unwillingness to engage with alternative political perspectives’, a sense that ‘if you are not with us, you are 
against us’. Within the EPRDF there is a dominant view that disagreements in policy and perspective 
should generate political competition from the outside, rather than dialogue. Indeed, such views of 
decision-making were put forward in interviews during the course of this research. Such views have 
significant  implications  for the way that  representation  is understood  within  government.  Rather than 
                                                 
4  This approach has been widely written about by development anthropologists who argue that this masking of 
the political under a “cloak of neutrality” is a key feature of modern power (Shore and Wright 1997). 
5  The frequently quoted exception to this is the involvement of the Standing Committee on Women’s Affairs in 
the revision of the family and penal codes. However, the driving force for change in this process is widely 
acknowledged to have been a civil society organisation, the Ethiopian Women’s Lawyers Association. 
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seeing representation as a means of aggregating and mediating different interests – representation is seen 
as contributing towards the building of consensus amongst decision-makers, with an important role for 
“the representative” in then conveying decisions made to the population.  
 
3.4 Pastoralist policy 
These views and approaches to policy-making feed into the government’s approach to “pastoralist policy”.  
Before discussing this, however, it is worth noting that “pastoralism” itself is not a clearly defined 
concept. There is implicit disagreement in statements over the concept of “pastoralism” and the definition 
and substance of “pastoralist issues” in Ethiopia. These terms are used differently by different actors, 
often to legitimise their own agendas. During the course of this study, the concept of “pastoralism” was 
used in a number of ways, including: 
 
• To signify identity, as an assertion of difference from or similarity with other groups. This appeared 
to cut across ethnic and class-based identities. 
• As a mode of production in a Marxist interpretation of economic and political struggle.  
• To denote a livelihoods issue, focused on the use of livestock. 
• As a mobilising force in politics. This is perhaps more significant at a federal level than at a regional 
level, where regions are either predominantly agricultural or pastoralist. 
• As a potential “sector” of policy. The disagreements around whether pastoralism should be a 
differentiated sector are discussed below. 
 
The shift that occurred in Amharic from use of the word for “nomad” (which had a pejorative sense) to 
“pastoralist” (referring to one whose livelihood is gained through livestock) was important, and many 
pastoralists believe this is indicative of a change in approach, and one which conferred on them status and 
acceptability. However this vocabulary change has now been taken further by some members of the 
government who place increasing emphasis on pastoralism as “being about livestock”, but make little 
reference to the social relations or cultural aspects of pastoralist ways of life. By framing pastoralism in 
“technical terms”, then “technical solutions” can be sought with the implication that the “problem of 
pastoralism” can be “solved” in this way.  
There is now an explicit commitment to the need for a holistic and pastoralist-specific policy and 
there is some evidence that, after years of neglect, the government is actually beginning to position itself as 
“champions” of pastoralists. Some, however, argue that any change in attitude is a result of the ruling 
party’s recognition of the need to exert greater control in pastoralist areas. Whereas military force was the 
chosen method in the past, “development projects” are a cost-effective way to extend control today into 
the so-called “emerging areas”, particularly when such initiatives will be largely funded from international 
sources. This paper argues that such different interpretations are not necessarily mutually exclusive but 
both can be held simultaneously, and the resulting position can be both realistic and productive. While 
different parts of the government may have different motivations and some parts may have a number of 
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potentially incompatible reasons for seeking change, there has been a notable change in both government 
rhetoric and action. It is clear that there are complex political processes occurring which are providing an 
opening of space for different interests to be articulated. 
It is probably correct to attribute the recent changes in the government’s attitude to a variety of 
internal and external factors including: 
 
• a recognition of past policy failure with regard to pastoralists, particularly the problems of a 
piecemeal, sectoral approach 
• international pressure, including from bi-lateral and multi-lateral organisations and international 
NGOs 
• a recognised need for stronger linkages with the so-called “emerging areas”, including a fear of 
instability in these areas 
• the split within TPLF which created a need for consolidation of the ruling party’s position and new 
allies, as well as the renewal process discussed above. 
 
The most contested aspect of “pastoralist policy” is whether its eventual goal should be to “settle” 
pastoralists. Until recently this was the explicit aim of government. However, there appears to have been a 
modification of this position somewhat, although some sources close to the government claim that this 
represents only a difference in the articulation of the policy, rather than a change of policy. The situation 
on this issue is currently shifting and is not entirely clear. Nor is it clear the extent to which pastoralist 
peoples should and can be involved in determining this and other critical issues.  
There have been recent changes in the structures of government responsible for “pastoralist policy”. 
An inter-ministerial board, with a technical board reporting to it, have been established within the Ministry 
of Federal Affairs (MOFA). The Pastoralist Unit in MOFA serves as Secretariat to that Board. While the 
establishment of this structure was heralded as a sign that government was taking pastoralist issues 
seriously, its institutional location has been interpreted by some as a desire for continued control. 
Furthermore, there are concerns about the extent to which ministers with broad mandates will be able to 
give sufficient attention to pastoralist issues, as well as the extent to which the board will be able to 
coordinate the pastoralist units remaining in different ministries. It is thought that this will hinder the 
adoption of a holistic approach. Accordingly there is a call by some, including some members of the PSC, 
for a separate pastoralist ministry or commission. This is currently being resisted by the federal 
government, mainly on the grounds that it is the responsibility of regional governments to oversee 
pastoral issues and technical weakness at this level should be addressed.  
 
13 
4  The functioning of the federal parliament  
Section two laid out three processes which mediate between citizen interests and policy outcomes in 
Ethiopia and the section above provided the broader context within which these mediating processes 
operate. This provides the essential background to a discussion of the functioning of the federal 
parliament. As discussed, parliament is heavily dominated by EPRDF members and affiliates. It has been 
widely criticised for merely “rubber-stamping” the decisions of the executive and being a body with little 
authority or power. Although it initiated a number of relatively minor bills in the previous parliament, the 
House of People’s Representatives has not initiated any legislation in the current parliament. All legislation 
has originated from the executive, although the submission of draft legislation by means of a private 
members’ bill requires the signature of only 20 MPs. As there are 25 opposition and independent MPs, 
they could have worked together to introduce legislation (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003). However, some 
point out in defence of the role of the Ethiopian parliament that it is usual within a parliamentary system 
for legislation to emanate from the executive branch. 
Moreover, despite the overwhelming dominance of the EPRDF in parliament, a number of 
interviewees in this study suggested that parliament’s role in articulating citizen interests has been 
increasing. In order to understand how the interests of pastoralists are mediated in the policy process 
through parliament and any shifts that may be occurring, this section explores two particular aspects of 
the functioning of the federal parliament. Firstly, it looks at the relationship between pastoralist MPs and 
their constituents. Secondly, it discusses a relatively new initiative, the Pastoralist Standing Committee, and 
attempts to assess the extent to which this structure might affect the way the interests of pastoralists are 
incorporated into policy processes.  
 
4.1 MP-constituent relationships  
There is considerable and widespread criticism of the limited extent of some MP’s knowledge of their 
constituents and their relatively infrequent visits to their constituencies. MPs themselves justify this in 
terms of the considerable difficulties they experience with logistics, transport and communication to very 
inaccessible areas. Indeed, these difficulties were observed in the course of this research. Moreover, it 
seems that contact with constituents is increasing in pastoralist areas. MPs for Afar, Somali, South Omo 
and Borana have recently spent an increased amount of time in their constituencies. There have also been 
occasions when pastoralist MPs have raised issues of concern to pastoralists in parliament. However, 
critics argue that those complaints raised within parliament usually in some way boost the EPRDF’s 
position on an issue, and certainly do not contradict it. The MPs raising these issues suffer little personal 
risk as they are not seriously challenging the government. Critics also question why the issue of recent 
famine, especially in Afar, has not been raised in parliament when it is of critical concern to so many of 
the residents of that region. 
When MP visit their constituencies, people do present their problems to them, both in group 
meetings and seeking them out on an individual basis. The issues they discussed in the course of this 
research included problems with health service delivery, water and telecommunications infrastructure, and 
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education. Some take the opportunity to voice complaints about the general lack of development in their 
areas, and serious concerns around levels of hunger. The MPs in Borana region promised to take up the 
issues with the relevant authorities, and we observed that they did so with woreda and zonal officials and, 
where possible, provided feedback to the communities concerned on the responses of these officials. A 
Somali MP, however, explained how, after years of effort and numerous attempts to take up the issues of 
his constituents with regional government, he had given up doing so. He considered such activity to be a 
waste of time, as it never produced any action on the part of regional government. In both regions, some 
people said they assumed that their MPs were speaking on their behalf at higher levels but they really had 
no idea what they did as there was no mechanism for finding out. 
It was also noticeable that the issues discussed between constituents and their MPs were all local. 
There was only discussion about the local manifestation of particular policies, but not about other national 
level policy or issues which were not perceived to have a particular impact locally. It was striking, for 
example, that although an important national-level issue – the decision of the Boundary Commission to 
assign Badme to Eritrea – was announced during the fieldwork in Borana none of the constituents 
discussed this issue with their MP. It was difficult to assess whether constituents limited their discussions 
to local issues because these were the areas where they felt the MPs had some influence, or they 
themselves were not interested or concerned about wider problems. 
It was clear from the research that the role of an MP is largely dependent on his (in these cases all the 
MPs were male) personality and individual charisma, capability, contacts, conscience and background. 
Some seemed intimidated by the presence of MPs and afraid to speak openly in front of them. Meetings 
held by the researcher with groups of constituents were very different in content and style when the MPs 
were present, and when they were not. Many of the contacts and work appeared to be informal and 
somewhat ad hoc, which raises the question of the extent to which access to MPs is affected by status, 
ethnicity, gender and proximity to urban centres. In some contexts, the MPs’ acceptability to their 
constituents in terms of ethnic background was also raised by constituents as an important factor in their 
relationship. This was perceived as a negative factor by some at the federal level, who argued that MPs 
from certain areas were strongly representative of their clans, rather than their broader constituencies.  
Aside from, but exacerbated by, the logistical and practical issues which constrain the relationships, 
there are serious issues about the nature of constituent-legislator relationships, and their mediation of 
citizen interests. As discussed above, many observers consider that the federal elections of 2000 were not 
“free and fair”. For most MPs, the real competition over their appointment occurred not at the ballot box, 
but at the time of their selection by the ruling party. Research for this study confirmed that in a number of 
areas people vote on the basis of party instructions. As one Borana elder explained 
 
the people we elect, they go away and they do a lot, at least we assume that they do, but there is no 
chance to interact with them,  so we don’t know.  We don’t know what X  [the Federal MP]  is doing 
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. . . The party people decide and tell us [whether to elect and re-elect him]. We can only know what 
the party people tell us about this, if they are good or not. We don’t know the day to day details of 
these people. 
 
Many commentators and constituents are therefore dismissive of the role of parliamentarians on the 
grounds that they are appointed by the ruling party, and that their selection is on the basis of party loyalty, 
rather than skills or expertise.  
This situation weakens the incentive for them to put forward their constituents’ interests effectively, 
as their re-appointment as MPs is not perceived to be in the hands of their constituents. Many informants 
in this study stated that they would choose whether to re-elect a current MP in the next elections on the 
basis of the party’s assessment of whether they should be re-elected, rather than whether they themselves 
judged that they had done a good job. Many expressed disillusionment with the voting system, saying that 
they would ‘just vote for whoever’ because they ‘didn’t care’. Furthermore, appointment to other political 
or parliamentary posts is also seen as dependent on political favour and there are thus strong incentives to 
remain loyal to the party. The pervasive nature of the party structure in the regions, the complex 
interlinking between the EPRDF and regional parties, as well as the democratic weakness of many 
regional parties, create a similar set of incentives for MPs from EPRDF-affiliated parties. There is a strong 
perception, therefore, that MPs prioritise their role as party representatives over that of constituent 
representatives. 
An additional criticism is levelled against MPs by some who question the “real roots” of MPs to 
pastoralist communities, arguing that many of them are from elite groups and are not familiar with those 
they claim to represent. Ironically, some of those who are perceived to be closer to their constituents are 
criticised for being insufficiently educated to be able to contribute appropriately in parliament. 
 
4.2 The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Pastoralist Affairs (PSC) 
The view of representation adopted here, however, shifts the focus away from the agency of these 
individual “representatives”, towards a broader analysis of the functioning and role of the Federal 
Parliament within policy processes. One of the recent changes within parliament, which affects how 
citizen interests are mediated through the parliament, is the establishment of a number of new standing 
committees, with mandates to oversee government bodies. One of these is the Parliamentary Standing 
Committee on Pastoralist Affairs (PSC) which was established in mid-2002.  
The roots of the PSC can be traced back to a workshop held in Kenya in 1999. It brought together 
pastoralists from the Horn of Africa, including Ethiopia, and also donors, traders, NGOs, activists and 
others interested in pastoralist issues, highlighting the exclusion of pastoralist voices from policy as a 
significant cause for concern. In particular, Ethiopian pastoralists learnt from the experience of Kenyan 
pastoralists in political organising.  
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The Pastoralist Communication Initiative (PCI) was subsequently formed in Ethiopia and began to 
meet with pastoralist Parliamentarians, initially individually and by region. In January 2002, it facilitated a 
workshop of 70 pastoralist Members of Parliament on representation of pastoralist communities in the 
affairs of federal government. International academics, Kenyan pastoralists leaders and others participated 
in further discussions with the pastoralist parliamentarians about the potential for an Ethiopian 
parliamentary group. The pastoralist MPs present proposed a small subcommittee of eight MPs tasked 
with setting up a standing committee. Membership of this interim committee was decided by region and 
area and was chaired by a Somali. 
The interim committee embarked on the task of establishing a standing committee, with the support 
and facilitation of PCI and others. Members lobbied government and various authorities and vigorous 
debates were held in response to the significant opposition expressed. In particular, legal advisors within 
parliament argued that pastoralist issues could be addressed within structures that deal with rural 
development and that a separate committee should not be accepted. However, after a period of 
negotiation, the establishment of the PSC was allowed.  
Five particular factors contributed to the successful establishment of the PSC. Firstly, the increased 
political attention to pastoralist issues, within the context of broader political changes and moves towards 
political pluralism, provided an opening of space for changes to occur. Secondly, a concurrent 
restructuring of parliament which reflected changes in the structure of government and the establishment 
of new ministries provided a specific political opportunity for structural change. Three new standing 
committees were created at this time. Thirdly, the support of the Speaker of the House was essential. He 
accepted from the outset that a critical constituency had been historically marginalised and that structures 
needed to be put in place to give greater voice to that constituency. Additionally he wanted a broader 
development of the capacity of parliament and an increased ability of its members to play a more engaged 
role in public life. Fourthly, the mobilisation of some 90 parliamentarians, including strong pressure and 
lobbying from some individuals was very important. A number of MPs spoke during this study of the 
personal encouragement and motivation they received by gathering with large numbers of other pastoralist 
MPs, and the resulting realisation of their numbers and potential for influence. Finally, PCI provided the 
catalyst for change in providing external information, including access to international experience and 
experts, facilitation for the mobilisation of the MPs and a variety of other resources and support for 
lobbying. 
The legislative function of the PSC is laid out in the Constitution and resulting legislation, including 
proclamation no 271/2002, in provisions applicable to all twelve standing committees in the House of 
People’s Representatives. Bills, which may be initiated by the House or drafted by the executive, are 
referred to the committees after preliminary readings. Having received a bill relevant to its mandate, a 
committee arranges a public hearing where relevant parties and individuals are invited to present their 
views and opinions. The dates and times of the public hearing and the agenda are announced in broadcast 
and print media,  and contributions by letter  or telephone are also invited.  After the public hearing, when 
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all views have been collected, the committee submits its report and recommendations to the Speaker of 
the House so that it can be added to the agenda for the next regular meeting of the House.6 Committees 
also exercise oversight over ministries and other government bodies relevant to their mandate.  
The oversight function of the PSC is directly mandated for the Livestock Dairy Products and 
Marketing Development Authority (a responsibility shared with the Trade Committee), with the right to 
provide oversight of the pastoralist sectors established in other ministries. In practice, the exercising to 
date by the PSC of its oversight function has been limited. Interviewees in this study consistently stressed 
the fact that the Committee is very new and has needed time to establish itself and build its own capacity. 
It is beginning to engage with nine ministries, including MOFA, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry 
of Water Resources and the Ministry of Education. The Head of the Pastoralist Unit at MOFA has been 
called before the Committee several times to answer questions. The PSC has also participated in the 
questioning of ministers by other standing committees. Moreover, there is clearly vigorous debate within 
the Committee on a number of critical issues, including the need for a separate Ministry for Pastoral 
Affairs and the issue of settlement.  
However, the constraints of the broader political context are likely seriously to limit the overall ability 
of the PSC to influence government policy and provide effective oversight. The influence of the EPRDF 
in the appointment of members undermines the claims to autonomy of all parliamentary standing 
committees in Ethiopia, with most of the prominent positions reserved for those who have been most 
active in the EPRDF. The PSC is no exception. Many will argue that the make-up of the PSC is carefully 
balanced to ensure representation of pastoralist regions, with non-pastoralist members included in order 
to integrate pastoralists further into national policy-making. However, several informants in this study 
considered that appointment to the PSC was carefully managed to ensure sufficient EPRDF input and 
control. They also suggested that, since MPs in the PSC tend to act as spokesmen for the broader group 
of pastoralist MPs, control of the PSC membership by the EPRDF limits the influence of the wider group 
of MPs. Nevertheless, there has been some negotiation around committee membership, and since its 
formation one member has been replaced by another with broader support from other pastoralist MPs. 
There are also questions about potential conflicts of interest between members of the committee and their 
business and humanitarian activities. 
Additional constraints to the influence of the PSC include: the political nature and sensitivity of 
“pastoralist policy”; the lack of formal mechanisms for relationships with broader body of MPs; a 
relatively limited formal mandate; resistance from some ministries; resistance from some other standing 
committees; overall capacity levels; and the continued expression by some of a discriminatory attitude 
towards pastoralists. 
Despite the many constraints it is experiencing and the limitations of the broader environment, the 
establishment of the PSC was an important achievement for pastoralist MPs, and both demonstrated and 
contributed to changing views about “representation”. In particular, it shows a recognition of the 
                                                 
6  Source: Background information: FDRE Office of the Government Spokesperson 30.12.98. 
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legitimacy of the demand for a separate consideration of pastoralist needs, embodying a move away from 
the view (discussed above) in which peasant approaches to development dominate. The establishment of a 
structure with the potential to influence policy and legislation on pastoralist issues also symbolises a move 
towards the increased influence of citizen interests in policy-making. It is also being used by some junior 
members of government and civil servants to raise issues where they do not wish to confront senior 
figures directly. Furthermore, the gaining of confidence, knowledge and energy by parliamentarians (not 
just those who are currently members of the PSC, but many others who participated in the process and 
fought for its establishment) will affect their ability to put forward their constituents’ views effectively in a 
number of contexts.  
The Committee could become a space in which genuine debate about pastoralist policy takes place, a 
forum in which the interests of different groups of pastoralists are aggregated and formed into a more 
coherent voice with greater potential for policy influence. Furthermore, the process of negotiation and 
contestation around initiatives such as the PSC may in itself contribute to an enlarging of political “space”. 
While the PSC influence on policy processes is for the moment an unrealised potential, we should not 
overlook its existing contribution to broader processes of negotiation and contestation occurring within 
Parliament. 
 
5  The functioning of regional and sub-regional structures  
This section analyses how the functioning of sub-federal layers of government affects the mediation 
between citizen interests and policy outcomes. In order to provide necessary context for the discussion, 
the first part provides an introduction to the fieldwork sites. Subsequent sections look at the functioning 
of the regional and sub-regional structures of government.  
 
5.1 Borana region, Oromia NRS 
Borana region was formally incorporated into Ethiopia by Amharic-speaking Christian highlanders during 
the Abyssinian monarchy under Menelik II in the late nineteenth century, but suffered minimal 
interference from the state for many years. The Ethiopian Revolution of 1974, however, brought 
increased contact with central powers. Boranas were forced to use Amharic in administration and the 
schools and much of their land was taken from them (Gudina 2003). However, under the Derg, 
considerable support was given to the Borana. Indeed, in 1987, Borana became a separate administrative 
region and large numbers of educated young Borana were given positions in the local party and 
administrative structures. The increased employment opportunities solidified support for the Derg and 
this new layer of civil servants and functionaries mediated between the Borana and the state. However 
when the EPRDF came to power, these civil servants became politically “suspect”, and wider suspicions 
affected the whole of the Borana as a group (Helland 1999).  
Oromia regional state, with its administrative capital in Nazareth/Addis has a relatively strong 
capacity. However, there is a sense of divorce between the further regions of the state and the regional 
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capital. The regional state has been trying to encourage private investment in the region and this has 
resulted in local businessmen fencing off and claiming exclusive rights to large tracts of land, as a result of 
which the Borana people have recently lost land for purposes that do not seem to benefit them (Helland 
1999).  
The political context in Oromia is complicated by the existence and activities of the Oromo 
Liberation Front (OLF). The OLF is an armed movement which claims that it is the only legitimate 
political representative for all the Oromo people (Joireman 1997). The OLF claims that it is currently at its 
historically strongest point in terms of military capacity (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003). There has certainly 
been a recent upsurge of military activity in the last few years, particularly along the Sudanese border.  
The “Gada” is the core traditional institution within Borana society and it serves political, judicial and 
ritual functions.7 Borana rule is based on a system in which decisions are made by consensus (not majority 
vote) and in which different institutions balance the power of different groups. Power-sharing rests on the 
division of roles between different institutions, with power distributed across generations and age groups. 
Each age group has distinct tasks and responsibilities, and each age group chooses its leaders by election, 
although there is some hereditary principle. Leaders are accountable to the people through a variety of 
mechanisms and can be removed from office if they do not perform adequately. Thus the Gada system 
structurally limits the amount of power exercised by any individual both through its eight year cycles, and 
by balancing power and position with countervailing institutions. Power is seen to rest ultimately with the 
people, a right they exercise either by direct participation or by delegating that power to leaders of their 
choosing to participate in different assemblies and meetings (Legesse 2000). 
The highest authority rests in the open national assembly (the Gumi) which takes place every eight 
years, in which all Gada councils and assemblies present and past participate and the Qallu (ritual leaders) 
participate as observers. Any individual is able to make his/her views known in the preliminary sessions, 
but the actual meetings consist of active and retired Gada leaders and members of Gada assemblies. There 
is no concept of a “majority” that can impose will on a “minority”, but, as in all assemblies, debate must 
be continued until the councillors reach an agreement. 
Some, such as Legesse, argue that women are effectively disenfranchised from the formal traditional 
institutions. Almost all ritual leaders are men, and women are also excluded from judicial activities. 
However, others argue that in many groups within Ethiopia, women may be formally excluded but it 
would be a mistake to assume political exclusion on the basis of gender. Women often influence political, 
social, economic and cultural processes through alternative means, although their means and form of 
influence can be harder to detect by an outside observer (Hodgson 2000). This issue was largely beyond 
the scope of this study, although attempts were made to judge the extent to which women were present in 
both formal state and traditional structures.   
 
                                                 
7  This section draws on Legesse (2000). 
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5.2 Somali NRS 
Although the Somali people were officially incorporated into Ethiopia at around the same time as the 
Borana, the reach of the state has remained much less in Somali Region, due to its inaccessibility and 
harsh terrain. For centuries, Somalis lived under decentralised, clan-based political systems, practising 
what has been termed “pastoral democracy” (Lewis 1961), with few ties to any centralised state. The 
Somali people are divided into six clan-families, each divided into sub-clans, sub-sub clans and so on. The 
most stable level is the sub-sub clan which ‘consists of close kinsmen united by a specific contractual 
alliance whose terms stipulate that they should pay and receive blood compensation’ (Lewis 1988, quoted 
in Adam 1992: 12). The Xeer is the clan law and customary system of the Somali. It is based on tribe, and 
tribe is understood as both a territorial unit and a political unit (Lewis 1955). Authority is delegated from 
the smallest structural unit (the rer, a group of people united by a certain object or activity, such as a river 
area) up to the highest office, the tribal chief, through a series of councils.  
Clanism has traditionally been blamed for much of the political turbulence experienced by Somalis 
over many decades, both by anthropologists (Lewis 1955) and by politicians and policy-makers. Markakis 
(1996: 570), for example, suggests that it remains an important factor in current political practice, ‘The 
new political order in Ethiopia does not seem to have affected the categorical imperative of Somali 
political practice which is clannishness.’ Some, however, question an over-emphasis on this which deflects 
attention away from injustice and inequality, suggesting that clanism should be understood as a ‘shield in 
the struggle against a lack of proportionality under a process of uneven development’ (Adam 1992: 15).  
The Somalis suffered repression and human rights abuses under the regimes of both Haile Selassie 
and the Derg, including aerial bombardment of areas inhabited by pastoralists during the time of the Derg 
(Khalif and Doornbos 2002). This repression stimulated the formation of a number of opposition groups, 
including the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) and the Ogadenia National Liberation Front 
(ONLF). The ONLF’s initial policy statement defined the Ogaden (a dominant Somali clan) as an 
‘oppressed nation colonised by Ethiopia’ and pledged to establish an ‘independent Ogaden state with full 
sovereignty in line with the aspirations of its people’ (Markakis 1994). It initially collaborated with 
EPRDF, participating in the transitional government, however trust broke down, and it moved towards a 
continuation of armed struggle (Khalif and Doornbos 2002). 
Current literature on the Somali region suggests that both elite and the masses are divided between 
supporting a more accommodative political structure within greater Ethiopia and a demand for full 
autonomy/independence. Some have identified a recent change of heart among some Somali elite 
stemming from a recognition of some of the advantages the region is now getting as the result of security 
concerns at the centre. 
Somali region remains perhaps the most problematic of the “peripheral” regions, in a ‘state of 
chronic insecurity’ (Khalif and Doornbos 2002: 81). There is widespread political, organisational and 
financial disorganisation within different branches of government. There have been endless rounds of 
political infighting, and sacking and imprisoning of politicians. The current Speaker is the third since the 
establishment of the position in Sept 2001. No woreda elections have been conducted since 1991. Nine 
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months into the financial year 2001/02 no budget had been agreed by the Regional government (Vaughan 
and Tronvoll 2003), and a large proportion of the budget was eventually returned unspent. As one Somali 
elder explained during the research ‘Regional government spends most of its time witch-hunting each 
other – so nothing is done for the people.’ 
 
5.3 Regional governments 
On paper the constitution grants regions substantive autonomy, including allowing them to enact their 
own parallel constitutions and the right to secede. The legislative branches of the nine regional states were 
assigned important functions in the 1995 regional constitutions, which referred to them as the ‘highest 
political authority’ in the region. However, although states enjoy residual powers under the constitution, 
several articles provide the federal government with considerable powers over policy, which could be 
interpreted and used as a veto over NRS policy decisions or as justification to withhold a federal subsidy 
from a locality administered by an alternative party (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003). 
Although there is a strong formal commitment to decentralised power through the regions, this has 
been questioned by many. A recent World Bank study (World Bank 2001) concluded that the system in 
place is characterised by administrative deconcentration, not the devolution of powers to elected bodies 
which is provided for in federal and regional constitutions. Others, including informants in this study, 
have questioned the underlying will of the federal government to devolve powers.8   
All regional parliaments are overwhelmingly dominated by the EPRDF and its affiliates (Polhemus 
2003), the Somali People’s Democratic Party (SPDP) and Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation 
(OPDO) in the regions in which research was carried out. Many of the criticisms levelled at both federal 
MPs and the federal parliament and rehearsed in some detail above are also made against regional MPs 
and parliaments. MPs are criticised for being chosen by the party, rather than the people, and many 
informants in this study therefore dismissed the regional parliaments totally.  
Aside from numerical control of parliaments, the party exercises other means of control in the 
regions. The party used to post “advisers” to regional governments. Indeed, a recent study in Tigray and 
SNNPRS showed that those regional governments were in practice directed by representatives of the 
TPLF. These men held no formal position, but acted as advisers or coordinators and held the authority to 
intervene and make final decisions in political and policy matters (Aalen 2002). While the federal 
government officially no longer posts “advisers” at regional level, the party structure of “cadres”, officers 
and local cells remains strong throughout the country and additional mechanisms are also employed to 
                                                 
8  It is also worth noting that the relationship between decentralisation and citizen responsiveness is far from 
clear, even in more open political contexts. A recent review of decentralisation in a number of African 
countries argues that, since decentralisation is essentially about the distribution of power and resources, 
political variables (especially the politics of central-local relations) explain decentralisation outcomes in terms of 
greater responsiveness. In Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Kenya, and Tanzania central governments have used 
funding either to create a dependant local elite or to consolidate an alliance with local elites based on the 
availability of patronage opportunities. This contrasts with a more responsive decentralisation in West Bengal, 
India, and Brazil where decentralisation was designed by a central government intent on challenging 
conservative local elites, and with a strong ideological commitment to anti-poverty policies (Crook 2003). 
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ensure ruling party influence. These range from a wide array of seminars and courses for state and party 
officials and bureaucrats to ensure an EPRDF “way of thinking”, to the direct disciplining of members of 
affiliated parties and their removal from office.  
The central control of regional and lower levels of governments through an opaque “dual structure” 
involving a variety of mechanisms was confirmed as widespread by informants in this study. In some 
particularly troubled areas, including the two where fieldwork was conducted for this study, federal armed 
forces have also intervened directly, including, some claimed, in political appointments. Nevertheless, 
representatives of federal government publicly deny “interfering” in regional government (except in cases 
where “security” issues demand it). They emphasise that the problems in the regions are due to the 
failures of regional governments. However, it is certainly true that regional autonomy is much less than 
that prescribed under the constitution. As Aalen commented (2002: 1), 
 
The most prevalent political development [in the period 1991–2000] is the consolidation of a 
centralised party rule along with the formalisation of a federal system, a development which implies 
an apparent paradox. According to fundamental federal theory, centralised party rule and genuine 
federalism are incompatible because the presence of an all-powerful party inevitably centralises 
power and undermines regional autonomy. 
 
5.3.1 Reform in the regions? 
The federal reform process discussed above has a number of provisions that affect regional 
administrations. One particularly significant area of recent reform has been an attempt to facilitate a 
separation of powers at the level of the regional state. The regional constitutions developed under the 
transitional government provided for the election of a Chief Executive on the recommendation of the 
party or parties in power. That person then became Chairman of the executive branch of government, 
President of the State, and also presided over the regional parliament. This blurring of executive and 
legislative functions has been recognised at the highest levels to be unsatisfactory, hindering the ability of 
the legislature to provide oversight (Polhemus 2003). By the end of 2002, all NRSs (with the exception of 
Harari) had amended their constitutions to ensure that a separate speaker and deputy speaker are elected. 
NRSs are in the process of establishing offices and staff of their regional parliaments separate from the 
executive branch and establishing new systems and procedures. Regional parliaments have now been 
charged with investigating the executive’s conduct and activities, thus establishing the principle of 
legislative oversight of the executive branch.  
However, in Somali region, in many people’s perceptions there was a continued lack of clarity about 
the roles of the party, the administration and the parliament. This lack of clarity in perception reflected the 
actual overlap in personnel and functions between the different institutions. There had been some 
attempts to separate functions, but in many informants’ eyes, not much progress had yet been made.  
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The potential influence of regional parliaments has also been recently enhanced by a number of other 
measures. Provision has been made to allow regional parliaments to form standing and other committees. 
In Somali NRS, for example, a regional Pastoralist Development Standing Committee was formed in 
February 2003, although it had yet to start functioning properly at the time of this study. However, in 
broader terms, Polhemus suggests that, although the evidence is anecdotal, ‘the trend seems to be towards 
more open debate in the Regional Councils. Increasingly, regional Presidents and bureau heads are 
experiencing searching questions and comments on reports they present to each Council session from 
both government and, where they exist, non-government members’ (Polhemus 2003: 11).  
However, despite recent changes, the research in Somali region revealed a widespread dismissal of 
the role and effectiveness of regional government. ‘Government has made no difference’ was a view 
commonly expressed during this research, and confirmed in the comments made in the recent PRSP 
consultation.9 In Fik district, for example, it was said that ‘government exists only by name but does 
nothing’. Indeed some considered government only a hindrance and an obstacle to development. 
Problems cited included lack of justice, corruption, the failure of government institutions to coordinate, 
and a lack of accountability. Additionally, there was a widespread view expressed in this research that 
some government officials benefited from the increased flows of resources to their areas brought by 
conflict. They thus attempted to perpetuate conflict, making “a trade on the insecurity”. 
It is not possible to extrapolate findings from Somali region to other regional governments, as that 
region is generally seen as an extreme case. Nevertheless, other studies reveal that all regional councils 
suffer severe human and other resource constraints which affect their abilities to carry out oversight 
functions effectively (Polhemus 2003). Furthermore, party control of regional governments restricts the 
extent to which these institutions are able to mediate between citizen interests and policy outcomes, since 
decisions are often made outside the formal structures of representation. Firstly, although regional officials 
are outspoken in their assertions that policy is made at regional level, in practice most over-arching 
policies are determined in the centre and citizen interests funnelled through regional structures do not 
influence it. Secondly, although policy implementation matters including budget allocations are decided at 
regional and sub-regional levels, regional parliaments appear to have little influence in these processes.   
 
5.4 Sub-regional levels 
The system of local government by zones, woreda, kebele and (in some places) sub-kebele, was 
established under the Derg and became widely feared as an instrument of both intelligence-gathering and 
repression. Under the EPRDF many of these structures continued to be subject to widespread abuse in 
places. Some officials wield considerable power and there are few mechanisms of accountability. The NRS 
elections of 2000 and the woreda and kebele elections of 2001 were extremely problematic in many 
regions, including areas of Oromia (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003).  
                                                 
9  Somali PRSP: Somali National Regional State: Districts and Regional Consultation Report on PRSP (2nd draft, 
2002, Jijiga. 
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However, changes are also underway at these levels of government under the “renewal” process, and 
there have been considerable attempts to “clean-up” local administrations. In most regions, elected 
councils at woreda and kebele level are now run by a cabinet consisting of officials who are also elected 
locally. Zones usually have coordinating functions only and so zone officials are often appointed rather 
than elected. There has also been a recent significant increase in the educational levels of local 
administrative officials (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003).  
In Borana region, the main site of research into the functioning of woreda and kebele structures, the 
articulation of local interests at these administrative levels seems to be working reasonably well. People do 
take issues of concern to the kebele council, or directly to the woreda or zone. Nonetheless, as at federal 
and regional levels, the party continues to play a strong and controlling role in the election of officials. 
Indeed, some argue that the grip of the party is strongest at local levels. Furthermore, women responded 
rather differently to men when asked about local level representation. They expressed a much greater level 
of disconnection from these state systems. Indeed, one organised group of women was extremely 
dismissive about the possibility of state channels providing anything of use, and argued that they were not 
going to waste their time on systems from which they expected to get nothing.  
Although there is expression of local concerns to kebele and woreda officials and councils, the 
influence of this on policy outcomes appears to be limited. There is the perception by citizens of a serious 
lack of connection between the kebele/woreda structures and higher levels of government. Many 
informants stated that the woreda had passed on their issues to zonal or regional authorities, and yet they 
had received no response and did not know what had happened to their complaints. Despite the strong 
official rhetoric about decentralisation from the centre, policy formulation decisions are perceived to 
emanate from levels higher than the woreda. Even woreda officials stated that they were mostly 
implementing bodies.  
In Borana, two particular issues which were seen to be crucial to local livelihoods were considered to 
be managed at federal level. The first related to the granting of land including wells along the border to 
Somali tribes,10 and the second to issues around conflict and security in the region. These have become 
very deep-seated grievances which have generated considerable anger, and yet some elders perceived that 
there were not adequate systems through which they might influence the outcome of decisions.  
It is also worth noting that relationships between communities and state authorities vary across and 
within regions. Different tribes relate differently to structures of government depending on a variety of 
local ethnic and political issues. For example, in Borana region, some argue that the Gabra tribe have 
generally been well-treated by the EPRDF in order to create a counter-force to the Borana. They have 
benefited with increased numbers of political positions. This tends to make Gabra relationships with state 
authorities more cooperative and collaborative, while further alienating the Borana, both from the state 
and from the Gabra.  
                                                 
10  See Helland (1999) and Shide (2003) for a discussion of this complex issue. 
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Somali region provided a contrast to Borana region, as the influence of woreda and kebele was seen 
to be very limited. No local level elections have taken place, although they have been planned and 
constantly postponed. Officials have been appointed to woredas and kebeles, but they are expected to 
implement decisions taken either at zonal or regional level. 
Significant changes in regional/central relationships are likely to be brought about across Ethiopia in 
the near future by the move towards block grants to woredas and the devolution of budgeting, 
expenditure and accounting (World Bank 2001). The speed with which this long-standing policy is 
currently being implemented can be attributed both to donor pressure and a desire on the part of the 
federal government to restrict the influence of higher levels of government (including regional and zonal 
officials) on woreda levels (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003). However this policy will have an uneven impact 
across the country. In Somali region, for example, block grants to woredas will be delayed until woreda 
elections have been held. There is, however, a move towards planning at a woreda level in this region.  
 
6  Interaction between state and traditional structures of 
representations 
The third process which mediates between citizen interests and policy influence in the Ethiopian context 
is the interaction between state and traditional structures of representation. After a brief discussion of 
potential differences in conceptualisation between state and traditional views of representation, this 
section concentrates on one particular form of interaction, the function of the “amakari” in Somali region. 
It then assesses the extent to which such interaction is able to mediate effectively. 
There are undoubtedly different conceptions of the role and practice of “representation” among 
different groups in Ethiopia. There are so many different peoples groups within Ethiopia with diverse 
ethnicities, histories and cultures that it would be unwise to make generalised statements about 
“traditional” or “customary” views of representation. It would be equally incorrect to assume that there is 
no diversity within ethnic groups, based on age, gender, status or other factors. Nonetheless, it is possible 
to consider how aspects of customary systems might affect the conceptualisation and practice of 
representation and how this might clash with the views of the majority “highlanders” in government.  
Across many of the traditional systems in Ethiopia there are similarities with the Gada system of the 
Borana (described above) especially in principles and practices around decision-making. For example, age 
is often given a high value within “traditional” socio-political structures. Elders serve in both formal and 
informal structures, and councils of elders are frequently used to solve inter- and intra-community 
disputes, as well as domestic issues. Elder councils are usually male, and often also exclude the 
“occupational castes” (see section three above). Decisions are usually consensus based.  
Some argue that a consensual, egalitarian-based approach contrasts with trends of the dominant 
“political culture” in Ethiopia. Vaughan and Tronvoll (2003) suggest that patterns of social interaction 
within Abyssinian traditions demonstrate a hierarchical stratification,  with a system of  social classification 
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in which people are not perceived to be equal and the world is not egalitarian. They suggest that these 
patterns of social interaction feed into a “political culture” which facilitates the continued dominance of 
central government as the source of the political agenda and decision-making.  
Despite a difference in conceptual understanding of principles of representation, at all levels of 
political structure there is interaction between traditional structures of representation and state structures. 
In many instances, this takes place through different positions being held by the same person. For 
example, a number of federal MPs are also high-ranking elders. However, this filling of both traditional 
and state roles is particularly frequent at lower levels. In Borana, some estimated that about 20 per cent of 
the kebele council (about 100 people) were also elders, and the consensus in every meeting was that at 
kebele level the councillors are “one of us”.  
There is a strong spoken commitment from those within political systems at all levels to respect 
traditional structures and not to interfere with matters which should be dealt with by traditional elders. 
They also sometimes provide financial and other support to customary celebrations. There is a widespread 
view that the situation is relatively better than under the Derg, when councils and other bodies had simply 
issued orders and expected them to be obeyed. Woreda and kebele officials do consult with elders about a 
wide range of issues including natural resource management and community mobilisation. On the surface 
there does not appear to be a big split or excessive levels of conflict between kebele/woreda officials and 
traditional elders. 
In some cases, particular structures have been established to allow traditional “representatives” to 
engage with formal political systems. Based on a system established in Afar region, in Somali NRS there is 
a constitutional provision for an ‘Assembly of Elders and Ethnic Leaders’. This has not yet formally been 
established and the proclamation necessary for its establishment had not (as at May 2003) yet been 
drafted. However, the system is already operating and is intended to bring traditional conflict management 
mechanisms into government (Polhemus 2003). A number of elders, known as “amakari”, are appointed 
and receive a salary to advise government at regional, zonal and woreda levels on matters relating to 
customary and community issues, and also to be involved in conflict resolution.  
A variety of views were heard in the course of this research about the extent to which this structure is 
an effective means of mediating interests. Some criticised the amakari strongly for being in the pay of the 
government and being divorced from the communities they claimed to represent. Others suggested they 
played a useful role, particularly in conflict resolution. However, there is certainly a question about the 
amakaris’ independence from the SPDP. The amakaris were first appointed just before the 2000 elections 
and many openly worked for the party at this time. During the course of this research, some amakari at 
different levels openly admitted bringing people into the party and persuading individuals who were 
planning to stand as independent or opposition candidates for the federal or regional parliaments to stand 
as SPDP candidates. They argued that it was important for the candidates representing their communities 
to have influence, and this could not be achieved outside the party. Furthermore they judged that the 
SPDP was the most likely party to bring benefits to their communities.  
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There was widespread agreement that the amakari exercise considerable control over the voting 
habits of the communities from which they come. It seems that the SPDP is anxious to retain the useful 
elements of the amakari, without allowing their power to grow too significantly. Some observers 
speculated that the failure to institutionalise their position and provide them with resources to mobilise 
themselves and work effectively (for example meeting space and offices) is a deliberate ploy to limit their 
influence.  
Despite the often harmonious interaction between state and traditional structures, there are three 
particular issues that emerged on more than one occasion in several sites as sources of grievance between 
elders and the political authorities. Firstly, in Borana, there was widespread alarm at the granting to 
farmers by woreda officials of land traditionally reserved for vulnerable flocks. This was seen as a 
significant problem by pastoralists which would undermine their livelihoods as well as their traditional 
systems of flock management. Secondly, the distribution of power within the kebele and woreda was often 
a source of grievance. Some elders who were used to their decisions being final, find now that their 
opinions are not considered binding. In particular, the relative youth of the council chairs is often also a 
source of grievance. Finally, there is sometimes conflict between state and traditional systems of justice. 
State systems are seen to be slow and difficult to deal with. On occasions, individuals convicted by 
traditional courts have appealed to the police and had their convictions and penalties overturned by the 
state system. This was seen to be a source of frustration as those convicted of crimes were allowed to 
escape unpunished.  
Undoubtedly the interaction between formal and traditional systems mediates between citizen 
interests and policy outcomes, and thus fulfils a “representation” function. However, three sets of 
questions about this mediation emerge from the research. Firstly, questions can be asked about the extent 
to which elders have been “co-opted” by their involvement with the government. It is not in doubt that 
elders who participate in political systems at all levels benefit financially from the government. Even those 
who hold no formal position but attend various “consultations” receive some financial compensation for 
their participation. What is in doubt is the extent to which their financial and other ties to the state or 
party affects their ability to put forward an independent articulation of interests within their community. It 
is difficult on the basis of this research to provide an assessment of this. Moreover, it is likely to vary from 
region to region, community to community and from individual to individual. Nonetheless, it is a question 
that should be asked. 
Secondly, there are questions about the extent to which the views articulated by elders are influential 
in policy decisions. The research suggested that the elders’ views were incorporated into decisions at 
kebele and woreda level. Indeed, many of those making the decisions were themselves elders. 
Nonetheless, the discussion above has highlighted areas of grievance and disappointment felt by some 
elders about their participation in these structures. Moreover, the lack of connection between these levels 
of government and higher levels has been noted. Decisions on a number of matters are widely believed to 
be motivated by political issues. For example, access to food and water is perceived by some as related to 
allegiance to the central state in Addis, with clans and individuals suspected of disloyalty denied the right 
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to use wells and receive food aid.11 There is a widespread perception that policy on certain important 
issues, such as land and security, is made at a federal level and that the views of elders are not significant in 
these decisions. Even when “consultations” have been held by the government on certain issues, some 
elders have suggested that this has only been for the sake of appearance.  
A third set of questions can be raised about the process of “interest aggregation” by elders. As 
discussed above, their traditional systems are based on consensus reached by adult males, and both 
women and outcast groups are usually excluded from these processes. The extent to which elders are 
therefore able to put forward a position which reflects the diversity of views from within their 
communities can be questioned. 
 
7  Conclusions: pastoralist representation in Ethiopia  
It was never the aim of this paper to form a judgement about whether representation “does” or “does 
not” occur in Ethiopia, or whether, for example, pastoralist parliamentarians are or are not 
“representative”. The concept of representation is too contested, both within Western political thought 
and within Ethiopia, and such an approach implies a view of political systems which is overly simplistic 
and unhelpfully functionalist. Just as there is more to “democracy” than the formalities of elections 
(Ottaway 1995; Carothers 2002), so there is more to “representation” than having “representatives” in 
parliament and other structures of government.  
Instead, this paper has conceptualised representation as the processes mediating between citizen 
interests and policy outcomes, identifying these in the Ethiopian context as: the functioning of the federal 
parliament; the functioning of regional and sub-regional systems of government; and the interaction 
between formal and “traditional” or “customary” systems. The analysis of these areas has been wide-
ranging, covering a number of levels, concepts and processes and it is not proposed to summarise all the 
points made and questions raised again here. Instead there are three related sets of conclusions relating to 
the case presented. These focus on: the role of individuals, the location of policy-decisions, and the factors 
influencing pastoralist policy.  
Firstly, although the focus of the paper has been on mediating processes, these do involve individuals 
who have a representative function. As discussed in section two, elected officials in many different 
contexts can be required to make trade-offs between the roles of a delegate, a trustee and party 
representative. In the Ethiopian context, officials at all levels were strongly perceived to act primarily as 
party representatives. The lack of free and fair elections and the system of party nominations for 
candidates strengthen the incentives for “representatives” to prioritise representing their parties when 
there is a potential conflict of interest. As discussed, individuals can represent the interests of others 
whether or not they have been transparently elected by those for whom they are supposed to speak.  
                                                 
11  For example, in April 1999 government troops denied pastoralists access to a portion of the Webi Shabelle 
River near Godey. Many people believe the reason is because the former chief of the ONLF belongs to the 
sub-clan that inhabits that area (Khalif and Doornbos 2002).  
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Undoubtedly there are occasions when individual MPs and other elected officials at different levels 
act in the interests of their constituents, even when this may be in conflict with their role as party 
representatives. Nonetheless, notwithstanding individual decisions and behaviours, the structures of 
political competition in Ethiopia operate in a way that provide incentives for individuals to represent 
parties, and not constituents.  
The second set of conclusions is around the broader processes which mediate between citizen 
interests and policy outcomes. There are many factors which affect how pastoralist interests are articulated 
within these processes, and many of these have not been explored in detail here. Factors which hinder an 
effective articulation include the poverty, inaccessibility and lack of education of much of the population; 
gender, age and minority discrimination; and clan rivalries. Historically, prejudice against pastoralists and 
their way of life has certainly been a significant factor. However, the analysis presented here has shown 
how the three processes identified are all critically affected by the dynamics of the policy-making arena in 
Ethiopia, and the politics within which it is embedded. A central argument of this paper therefore is that, 
although there are structures in which those who hold representative positions participate, the most 
significant policy decisions are taken outside those structures. The scope for the effective linking of citizen 
interests to policy outcomes through these political structures is therefore limited.  
A third set of conclusions is an implication of the other two. It has been argued that many policy 
decisions are somewhat unconnected to the articulation of pastoralist interests and the actions of 
pastoralist “representatives”. Instead, they are the result of a strong and still relatively centralised decision-
making structure dominated by the EPRDF. Policy-making around pastoralism cannot therefore be 
understood by focusing only on “pastoralist issues”. Pastoralist issues and policy are affected by processes 
and changes at different levels – international, federal, regional and sub-regional – as well as by shifting 
relationships between different actors at different levels. They are also affected by a range of other issues 
and dynamics in Ethiopia, and link directly to broader concerns and processes. These issues include: 
 
• the relationship between federal and regional governments.  
• land issues, including debates about private ownership. 
• broader economic performance and development and a concern to “modernise” Ethiopia, bringing 
the country into global markets. 
• the stability of the Federation and concern about secessionist tendencies in some regions where 
pastoralists live, particularly Somali. 
• inter- and intra-ethnic conflicts which frequently break out in pastoralist areas, and act as a 
considerable drain on state resources.  
• conflict with neighbouring states. The terms of the settlement of the Ethiopian-Eritrean War are 
considered very unsatisfactory by many Ethiopians and concerns about border security in pastoralist 
areas are strong.  
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• donor concerns (especially about poverty levels and the Millennium Development Targets). Ethiopia 
is a strongly aid-dependent state, and while the government frequently rejects donor demands, its 
room for manoeuvre is limited. 
• The tension between the EPRDF/TPLF desire to retain control, and internal and external demands 
for democratisation and political pluralism. 
• The role and legitimacy of traditional structures and their links to structures of the state. 
• Regional and sub-regional political issues, which vary by region. 
• Concerns about pastoralist cross-border trade and contraband.  
 
These three sets of conclusions might appear somewhat negative about the state of representative 
government in Ethiopia and the extent to which pastoralists can influence policy in their favour through 
those whom they elect. However, the political context in Ethiopia is changing. As this paper has suggested 
there are different interpretations of those changes. Some see them as a sign of a cautious and incremental 
“opening-up”, others interpret the changes as cynical manipulation by those in power to reinforce a 
control that might be weakening. As Vaughan and Tronvoll (2003: vi) put it, ‘Ethiopia’s leaders seem 
poised either for a renewal of progress towards devolution and “power-sharing”, or for a dive into 
increased authoritarianism, and repression of competitors.’ 
Whatever the motivation for and extent of changes (and there is probably some truth in a number of 
views), it is argued here that there are spaces opening up which can allow for a more effective articulation 
of citizen interests to influence policy. These spaces appear to be constantly shifting – opening, then 
closing, and opening again somewhere else. However, it does appear that the type and use of these spaces 
is open to negotiation, contestation, re-interpretation, and challenge in various arenas and by different 
actors. Furthermore, these processes are occurring not only in relation to broad political issues and 
democratic opening, but simultaneously around a number of policy issues. Government is indisputably 
engaging with issues around pastoralism in ways that it has not done in the past. Understanding how 
engagement in this issue is linked to and affected by broader political shifts and developments in different 
policy arenas will help those concerned with enhancing pastoralist “representation” in Ethiopia. 
It is, perhaps, unwise to draw broader conclusions from research into one case. Nonetheless, the 
mobilisation of pastoralist MPs, and especially the formation of the PSC has provided an example of how 
“representatives” of poor and marginalised groups have come together to work through formal political 
structures in favour of those they “represent”. Critical factors in their mobilisation included changes in the 
broader political environment as well as a specific moment of organisational change, the influence of key 
actors both internally and externally, and the cumulative effect of the actions of a substantial group of 
MPs. However, the key constraint to the influence of both this group and other structures of political 
representation remains the broader political environment, with a lack of political competition and an 
absence of institutionalised democratic processes.  
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